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This paper shows that the combination of habit formation - present consumption creating 
additional consumption needs in the future - and myopia may explain why some retirees are 
forced to ‘unretire’, i.e., unexpectedly return to work. It also shows that when myopia about 
habit formation leads to unretirement there is a case for government's intervention. In a first-
best setting the optimal solution can be decentralized by a simple ‘Pigouvian’ (paternalistic) 
consumption tax (along with suitable lump-sum taxes). In a second-best setting, when 
personalized lump-sum transfers are not available, consumption taxes may have conflicting 
paternalistic and redistributive effects. We study the design of consumption taxes in such a 
setting when myopic individuals differ in productivity. 
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Over the last decade, most of the discussion over the rate of labor participation of
elderly workers and over the retirement decision has focused on the decline in activity
resulting from generous and distorting social security schemes.1 The fact that at the
same time some workers, admittedly a minority, could have some regrets and could try
to get out of retirement was neglected. And yet, there is an increasing number of workers
who decide to work for pay after they retire. This number is clearly more important in
countries where earnings tests are not enacted. In a recent survey conducted in the US,
77% of workers expect to work after retirement and among the retirees, 12% do work
for pay.2 In the same survey, two-third do work after retirement because they want to
and one third because they have to. Not surprisingly, people's attitudes vary according
to how much they earn and the kind of work they perform. Maestas (2007) studies
this behavior known as \unretirement" and tries to explain it. She also explores two
hypotheses: unretirement is unexpected resulting from failures in planning and nancial
shocks or unretirement is expected but reects a complex retirement process. She shows
that for the majority unretirement is anticipated. It remains that one out of ve retirees
unexpectedly returns to work.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical explanation for such a behavior and look for
its consequences for optimal taxation design. It relies on two concepts, habit formation
and myopia, that are introduced in a two period model. Individuals work during the
entire rst period and for part of the second period. In other words, labor supply is xed
and unitary in the rst period; in the second one it is endogenous and can be viewed
as the age of retirement. In the rst period, individuals consume a certain fraction of
their earnings, which brings some utility but creates some needs or habits in the second
period. However we assume that out of myopia or ignorance, individuals underestimate
the extent of this habit formation. Consequently, when they reach the second period,
they face unexpected consumption needs along with insucient saving, which forces
them to work longer than expected; concretely they postpone retirement or they are
1Gruber and Wise (1999).
2Pew Research Center (2007). See also Herz (1995).
1forced to unretire. The myopic habit formation model is capable of explaining the
prolonged activity or the unretirement patterns discussed above. There is other recent
evidence that support the use of this model: Fehr and Sych (2006) ask whether myopic
of farsighted habit formation ts better observed behavior and argue that individuals
tend to behave as the myopic habit formation model predicts.
To the best of our knowledge, the combination of habit formation and myopia has not
been studied previously in the literature, with the exception of Diamond and Mirrlees
(2000). Our approach diers from theirs in two ways: they focus on saving and not on
labor supply and they do not look for the tax policy implications of habit formation.
As it is standard in behavioral economics, myopia calls for government's intervention
aimed at avoiding that individuals are forced to unretire. With identical individuals, it
suces for the government to induce more saving or to tax rst period consumption.
With individuals diering in earnings, and in the absence of lump sum transfers, our
linear tax instruments play two roles: correction for myopia and redistribution. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model along with the market
and the rst-best solutions are presented. Section 3 is devoted to the second-best.
2 The model
2.1 Market solution
We consider an individual with wage w. He works one unit of time in the rst period of
his life and thus earns w. This earning is divided into current consumption c and saving
s. In the second period, he works an amount of time ` 6 1, and earns w`. Total second
period income is then equal to w` + s and devoted to second period consumption, d.
Individual utility is given by
U (c;d;`) = u(c) + v (d;c)   h(`);
where v (d;c) is the utility for second period consumption that depends on rst period
consumption.
We assume that u is strictly concave and h strictly convex. As for v(d;c) it is
also strictly concave and increasing in d. Our habit formation assumption implies that
2vc < 0 and vdc > 0; namely previous period consumption generates additional needs
and reduces second period's utility.3
Myopia is represented by the fact that in the rst period of their life, individuals do
not see this delayed eect of consumption and thus in their choice of saving and in their
expected retirement age they use v(d;0). A farsighted individual would have a correct
perception of such an habit formation, that is v(d;c).
To keep the analysis simple, we adopt a simple form for the function v:
v(d;c) = u(d   c);
where  = 0 for myopic individuals in the rst period of their life, and  =   as the
true value of the parameter (used by myopic individuals in the second period, and by
farsighted in both periods).
We rst study the impact of myopic behavior on consumption and retirement deci-
sions. With this formulation and using the budget constraint, the individual problem
in the rst period can be written as
max
s;`p u(w   s) + u(w`p   w + (1 + )s)   h(`p)
where `p is the amount of labor that the individual plans to supply in the second period,
and where the myopic individual mistakenly uses  = 0 while the farsighted uses the
correct value of  =  . The FOCs are given by
[s] :  u0(w   s) + (1 + )u0(w`p   w + (1 + )s) = 0 (1)
[lp] : wu0(w`p   w + (1 + )s)   h0(`p) = 0: (2)
The appendix shows that the equilibrium amount of saving increases with , so that
a myopic individual saves less and consumes more in the rst period than a farsighted
individual. This is intuitive, since the myopic individual under-estimates the needs that
rst period consumption creates later on. On the other hand, the sign of the derivative
of `p with respect to  is ambiguous. On the one hand, the myopic individual under-
estimating his needs calls for a smaller planned labor than for the farsighted individual.
3An alternative specication is to assume vc > 0, which implies that previous consumption brings
status and hence additional utility.
3On the other hand, the myopic individual over-estimates the benets from working
longer, since part of any additional labor income is consumed in the rst period, and
since he does not anticipate the negative impact of such consumption later on. Formally,
solving simultaneously the FOCs (1) and (2), we obtain that
u0(c)
1 + 
w = h0(`p): (3)
For a given `p, the numerator of the left-hand side of (3) increases with  (as c decreases)
while the denominator is also increasing in , so that it is not possible to sign the
derivative of `p with respect to .
In the second period, individuals choose their (realized) labor supply by solving
max
`
u[w`   w + (1 + )s]   h(`);
which yields the following rst-order condition
wu0 [w`   w + (1 + )s] = h0(`): (4)
Observe that condition (4) is identical to (2) for farsighted individuals: their realized
labor supply is identical to their planned one. As for myopic agents, they dier since
they realize in second period that the true value of  is  and also realize they have
saved too little in the rst period.
From (4), it is easy to see that the optimal value of ` decreases with s. As we know
that a myopic individual saves less than a farsighted one, we obtain that the realized
labor supply of a myopic individual is larger than the one of a farsighted individual. The
intuition for this result is that a myopic individual under-estimates his second period
needs and does not save enough in the rst period, so he is obliged to work more than
planned, and also more than a far sighted individual. In other words, myopia leads to
prolonged activity or even to unretiring.
From now on we shall assume that all individuals are myopic and have  = 0. The
farsighted who are mentioned are merely used as a benchmark.
42.2 First-best
We now turn to the rst-best solution assuming that the social planner observes the
productivity of each individual and their degree of myopia, but imposes its own view
by inducing individuals to behave as if they were farsighted. We assume that the social
planner adopts an objective function with  =  :




E fu(c) + u(d   c)   h(`) + (w + w`   c   d)g:
This leads to the FOCs:
[c] : u0(c)   u0(d   c) = ; (5)
[d] : u0(d   c) = ; (6)
[`] : h0(`) = w: (7)
The planner equalizes marginal utility of consumption across periods and across
individuals; separability guarantees that the consumption (in the same period) of in-
dividuals of dierent productivities will be the same. Habit formation implies that
consumption in the second period will be higher than in the rst period. Labor supply
increases with productivity; this means that more productive individuals will retire later
than less productive ones.
To discuss the possibility of decentralizing such an optimum, we introduce the tax
instruments that we will use below: a tax on rst period consumption, c; a tax on
second period consumption, d and a lumps sum transfer T(w) that, for the time being,
may depend on wage.
The rst period problem of our myopic individual is to maximize:
u(c) + u(dp)   h(`p)   1 [c(1 + c) + dp (1 + d)  w(1 + `p)   T(w)]:





5where dp is the planned second period consumption and 1 is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the budget constraint. We thus have:
[c] : u0 (c) = 1 (1 + c); (8)
[dp] : u0 (dp) = 1 (1 + d); (9)
[`p] : h0 (`p) = 1w: (10)
In the second period, the problem is to maximize
u(d    c)   h(`)   2 [d(1 + d)   s   T(w)   w`];
where 2 is the Lagrange multiplier (which is dierent from 1) associated with the
second period budget constraint. The corresponding FOCs are given by
[d] : u0 (d    c) = 2 (1 + d); (11)
[`] : h0 (`) = 2w: (12)
To achieve the rst-best one needs to induce the myopic individuals to save the appro-
priate amount. From there on, the choice of retirement age will be optimal. To obtain




(1 +  )u0 (d    c)
u0 (d)
;
where the * denotes the rst-best solution. Interestingly, one only needs one of the two
tax instruments supplemented by the lump sum transfer T(w): More specically one
needs
c =
(1 +  )u0 (d    c)   u0 (d)
u0 (d)
> 0 with d = 0; (13)
or
d =
u0 (d)   (1 + )u0 (d    c)
(1 +  )u0 (d    c)
< 0 with c = 0: (14)
In words, to decentralize the rst-best solution, one needs a Pigouvian tax on rst period
consumption or a Pigouvian subsidy on second period consumption (that is equivalent
to a subsidy on saving). With heterogenous individuals, decentralization also calls for
individualized transfers T(w).
63 Second-best
As we have just seen with taxes c;d and individualized transfers T(w), one can achieve
the rst-best optimum. Let us assume that such transfers are not available and that the
transfer is constrained to be the same for all. It is denoted by T which now represents
the demogrant and is determined by the (government) budget constraint
T = cEc + dEd:
In such a setting, we expect that the two taxes will play two roles: a corrective Pigouvian
role (positive for c; negative for d) and a redistribution role (the taxes are used to
nance the demogrant).














where  = 0. This yields the eective level of c and a planned value of second period
labor supply `p: Both are functions of tax instruments and yield a planned value for d,
dp: Ex post, given c, they maximize (15) with  =   to determine the eective levels of
d and ` which are dierent from the planned one dp and `p.
The social planner will choose the tax instruments c;d and T on the basis of the
preferences of (hypothetical) farsighted individuals (but based on the behavior of the
myopics). As a consequence, in solving the social optimization problem we cannot use
the envelope theorem for the choice of saving. The Lagrangian expression associated















c   (T   cc   dd)

;
where  is the multiplier associated with the revenue constraint and c, d and ` now
represent the optimal choices of the individuals for the policy instruments.






















































u0 (d    c)  
1 + c
1 + d



















The term  reects the cost of myopia in terms of ex post utility. It tends to 0
when   tends to zero. The term b is quite standard in the linear taxation literature; it
is what Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) call the net social marginal valuation of income.
It is measured in terms of government revenue. It is net in the sense that the eect of
a lump sum transfer includes the direct eect on individual utility but also the indirect
eect on tax revenue.








































Using the traditional procedure of replacing all Marshallian price eects by its equiv-
alent decomposition in Hicksian price eects and income eects (the Slutsky equation)





























where e c and e d are the compensated demand functions. To get more intuition let us rst
consider the case when only one of the consumption taxes (either c or b) is available.























E @ ~ d
@d
with c = 0: (17)
First of all, if  = 0, namely if there is no myopia, we only have the rst part of these
formulas, that is standard in optimal consumption tax with heterogenous individuals.
The numerator reects the redistributive objective; it is negative as the covariance
between the marginal utility of income and consumption is negative. This term would
be zero with identical individuals or without concern for redistribution (linear utility).
The denominator is also negative and reects the eciency eect (deadweight loss).
The tax and thus redistribution will be larger if the (compensated) demand for c or d
is inelastic.
Note that if the rst part of (16) and (17) were equal to zero, we would end up with













If we assume that c and d have the same redistributive pattern (same covariance be-
tween marginal utility of income and consumption) and the same price elasticity, two
reasonable assumptions, one can state that d < c if the two taxes are used alone.
Let us now turn to the case when the two taxes are used together. Then we have:
c =
cov(b;c)E @ ~ d
@d   cov(b;d)E @ ~ d
@c
E @~ c
@c E @ ~ d
@d   E @~ c







@cE @ ~ d
@d   @~ c




@c E @ ~ d
@d   E @~ c






@c   cov(b;c)E @~ c
@d
E @~ c
@c E @ ~ d
@d   E @~ c













@c E @ ~ d
@d   E @~ c
@d E @ ~ d
@c
: (19)
These are very complex formulas. Note that in the case where cross derivatives @ ~ d=@c
and @~ c=@d are negligible, we end up with the above formulas (16) and (17). In other
9words, what makes these formulas (18) and (19) dierent is the set of cross eects. We
know little about the size of these cross eects.
Note that the expressions for c and d have the same denominator which measures
the ineciencies introduced by the tax system. Also note that the denominator is equal
to the determinant of the Slutsky matrix and consequently we can expect it to be pos-
itive. Focusing on the numerators, they include a positive equity eect (the numerator
of the rst fraction) and a corrective eect (the numerator of the second fraction). Both
eects are intuitive and very similar to what happens when only one of the taxes is
present. The rst eect (positive for both c and d) is related to equity since the co-
variances measure inequality in consumption. With cross-price eects, we have to take
into account covariances between marginal utility of income and consumption in both
periods for both taxes. The second eect is related to myopia since it is proportional
to . The presence of cross-price eects makes it dicult to sign this term.
An interesting case emerges when the form of the utility function implies demand
functions which exhibit multiplicative separability. Suppose (compensated) demand
functions can be written as
e c = c(w)  c(c;d) and e d = d(w)  d(c;d): (20)
In this case
c =
cov(b;c)E @ ~ d
@d   cov(b;d)E @ ~ d
@c
E @~ c
@c E @ ~ d
@d   E @~ c













@d   cov(b;d)E @~ c
@c
E @~ c
@c E @ ~ d
@d   E @~ c
@d E @ ~ d
@c
:
Consequently, in this special case only the tax on rst period consumption is corrected
by a Pigouvian term and the taxation of second period's consumption is only used for
redistribution. The Pigouvian term is positive meaning that the tax on the rst period's
consumption is higher in the presence of myopic habit formation than when this type
of behavior is absent.
This can be stated in terms of the so called targeting principle (Sandmo, 1975)
which says that to correct for the consequences of externalities Pigouvian terms must
10be included only in the taxes of the goods that generate the externality and not in other
goods. One can see myopic behavior as generating an externality from one incarnation
to another incarnation of the same individual. The reason that the principle of targeting
found by Sandmo does not hold in the general model in this paper is that it applies
only to atmosphere externalities. When externalities are not of the atmosphere type, the
principle of targeting does not apply as happens in the general formulation in this paper
(unless we have multiplicative compensated demand functions as specied by (20)).
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the pattern of consumption taxes in a two period model with in-
dividuals who have in the second period needs that are related to their rst period
consumption but who don't see this habit formation relation when they make their sav-
ing decision. In a identical individuals setting, the rst-best can be achieved by taxing
rst period consumption or subsidizing second period consumption. When individuals
have dierent wages, both consumption taxes are needed not only to correct for individ-
ual myopia, but also to nance redistribution. Under plausible assumption, we expect
rst period tax to be higher than second period tax.
The idea that taxation should vary with age is not new. Banks et al. (2007) following
what is called the new dynamic public nance argue in favor of an age-dependent taxa-
tion. Lozachmeur (2006) reaches the same conclusion but showing that elderly workers
should be subject to a lower tax than the others because they are exposed to both in-
tensive (how many hours a week?) and extensive (when to retire?) labor supply choice.
In this paper, we also reach the conclusion that second period consumption should be
taxed at a lower rate than rst period work. The reason is that one has to correct for
a myopic behavior which leads individuals to save too little and forces them to work
longer than initially expected.
11Appendix
A Impact of  on savings and labor supply
Dierentiating the FOCs (1) and (2) with respect to , and denoting the derivatives of
s and `p with respect to  by sa and `
p
, we obtain
u00(c)s + (1 + )u00(d   c)[w`p
 + (1 + )s] + u0(d   c)
  (1 + )u00(d   c)[w   s] = 0;
wu00(d   c)[w`p
 + (1 + )s]   wu00(d   c)[w   s]   h00(`p)`p
 = 0;







u00(c) + (1 + )2u00(d   c) (1 + )wu00(d   c)




 u0(d   c) + (1 + )u00(d   c)[w   s]
wu00(d   c)[w   s]





[w2u00(d   c)   h00(`p)]
 





[u00(c) + (1 + )2u00(d   c)]
 









D = [u00(c) + (1 + )2u00(d   c)][w2u00(d   c)   h00(`p)]
 [(1 + )wu00(d   c)][(1 + )wu00(d   c)] > 0
and
R =  u0(d   c) + (1 + )u00(d   c)[w   s] < 0:
From there, it is easy to show that s > 0, since its numerator is equal to
12[ u0(d   c) + (1 + )u00(d   c)[w   s]][w2u00(d   c)   h00(`p)]
  (1 + )w2(u00(d   c))2[w   s] =
  u0(d   c)w2u00(d   c) + (1 + )w2(u00(d   c))2[w   s]
  Rh00(`p)   (1 + )w2(u00(d   c))2[w   s] =
  u0(d   c)w2u00(d   c)   [ u0(d   c) + (1 + )u00(d   c)[w   s]]h00(`p) =
  u0(d   c)w2u00(d   c)   Rh00(`p) > 0:
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